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Abstract
No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal randommatch-
ing mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out
of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mech-
anisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of
the randomization over deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy
but not group-strategyproof.
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1 Introduction
An ideal mechanism would be impossible to manipulate, efficient and fair.
For house matching problems, where a finite set of agents with linear prefer-
ences over houses needs to be matched to these houses, there exists no group-
strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism that
treats equals equally. So group-strategyproofness, one of the strongest non-
manipulability requirements, clashes with some of the weakest efficiency- and
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fairness-criteria: ex-post Pareto optimality and equal treatment of equals. A
mechanism that maps every profile of preferences to a lottery over Pareto
optima is ex-post Pareto optimal. The mechanism treats equals equally, if
any two agents who submit the same preference face the same lottery over
houses. It is group-strategyproof if no group can improve their outcomes
by lying about their true preferences. Group-strategyproofness strengthens
strategyproofness which only requires that no agent is ever harmed by truth-
fully revealing his preference.
My result complements Bogomolnaia and Moulin’s [1] theorem that no
strategyproof and ordinally efficient matching mechanism treats equals equally.
While Bogomolnaia and Moulin and I use the same weak criterion of fair-
ness, our efficiency and non-manipulability requirements differ: where I only
impose ex-post Pareto optimality, Bogomolnaia and Moulin require ordi-
nal efficiency; where they only impose strategyproofness, I require group-
strategyproofness.
Papai has given a very useful characterization of group-strategyproofness:
a deterministic matching mechanism is group-strategyproof if and only if
it is strategyproof and non-bossy, in the sense that no agent can change
another agent’s outcome without also changing his own. While, Barbera,
Berga, and Moreno [2] shows that this equivalence extends far beyond house-
matching problems, Thompson [9] provides an overview on where the equiv-
alence holds (and where it fails). I apply Theorem 1 to the question whether
this equivalence carries over to random matching mechanisms. Random se-
rial dictatorship, which arises out of a uniform randomization over the order
of agents as dictators in serial dictatorship, is ex-post Pareto optimal and
treats equals equally. By Theorem 1, random serial dictatorship is not group-
strategyproof. To show that Papai’s equivalence result does not extend to
the random matching context it only remains to show that random serial
dictatorship, which is known to be strategyproof, is non-bossy. To this end,
I show in Theorem 2 that any randomization over a set of non-bossy and
strategyproof mechanisms yields a non-bossy random matching mechanism.
Since any serial dictatorship is non-bossy and strategyproof, random serial
dictatorship is non-bossy.
The results presented here cover matching problems with and without
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outside options. In fact, only minor changes are necessary to extend the
proofs from one case to the other. In contrast the presence or absence of out-
side options plays a crucial role in parts of the matching literature: Svensson’s
[8] characterization of serial dictatorship does not extend to the case with
outside options. Kesten and Kurino [4] shows that while deferred acceptance
is an optimal mechanism when considering the full domain of preferences
with outside options, improvements upon deferred acceptance are possible
if (at least some) agents have no outside options. Erdil [3] constructs a
random matching mechanism that ex-ante Pareto dominates random serial
dictatorship when agents have outside options.
2 Definitions
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents and a set of houses H. The option to
stay homeless (∅) is always available ∅ ∈ H. Generic elements of H (including
∅) are denoted h. A matching is a set of agent-house pairs denoted as a vector
x ∈ Hn where xi = xj and i 6= j imply xi = ∅. Under x agent i is unmatched
if xi = ∅, otherwise house xi is agent i’s is match. The set of all matchings
is X. Agent i’s preference on H is a linear order %i. So %i is complete,
transitive and h ∼ h′ implies h = h′. A profile of all agents’ preferences
(%i)i∈N is denoted %, where %G and %−G are the preferences of all agents
in some group G ⊂ N and outside that group, so %= (%G,%−G). The set Ω
is the set of all profiles of linear orders on H. Agents are selfish in the sense
that they only consider their own houses when ranking different matchings.
The grand set of matching problems, described by Ω and X allows for
outside options: matchings may leave some agents and houses unmatched
and agents may prefer homelessness to some houses (∅ i h holds for some
%∈ Ω, i ∈ N and h ∈ H). Throughout the text ∅ 6= Ω˜ ⊂ Ω stands for an
arbitrary, non-empty, domain of linear orders, with (%′G,%−G) ∈ Ω˜ for any
%,%′∈ Ω˜ and G ⊂ N . The domain for which all agents rank homelessness ∅
as their worst option is denoted Ωˆ. The subset Xˆ ⊂ X of matchings without
outside options, is such that the number of unmatched agents under any
x ∈ Xˆ is minimal. Together Ωˆ and Xˆ describe the set of matching problems
without outside options.
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A mechanism φ maps Ω˜ to the set of matchings X and agent i obtains
φi(%) under φ at the profile %. A random mechanism ρ maps Ω˜ to ∆X,
where the set of all lotteries on some finite S is denoted ∆S. Under ρ agent
i faces the lottery ρi(%) ∈ ∆H at % where ρi(%)(h) : = ρ(%)({x | xi = h})
is the probability that i is matched to h under ρ(%).
The mechanism ρ : Ω˜ → ∆X is (ordinally) group-strategyproof
if any group-deviation that changes the outcomes for this group, renders
some group-member ordinally worse off, in the sense that his probability to
receive a house better than h′ weakly decreases for all h′ and strictly de-
creases for some h∗. So ρ is group-strategyproof if for all (%,%′G, G) with
ρi(%) 6= ρi(%′G,%−G) for some i ∈ G, there exists some i∗ ∈ G and h∗ ∈ H
such that
∑
h%i∗h∗ ρi∗(%)(h) >
∑
h%i∗h∗ ρi∗(%
′
G,%−G)(h) and
∑
h%i∗h′ ρi∗(%
)(h) ≥ ∑h%i∗h′ ρi∗(%′G,%−G)(h) for all h′ ∈ H. Restricting attention to
singleton groups G, (ordinal) group-strategyproofness reduces to (ordinal)
strategyproofness and ρ is ordinally strategyproof if
∑
h%ih′ ρi(%)(h) ≥∑
h%ih′ ρi(%
′
i,%−i)(h) holds for all (%, i,%′i) and h′ ∈ H. The mechanism
ρ : Ω˜ → ∆X satisfies equal treatment of equals if any two agents who
announce the same preferences face the same distribution, so ρi(%) = ρj(%) if
%i=%j. A mechanism ρ is ex-post Pareto optimal if ρ(%)(x) > 0 implies
that x is Pareto optimal at %.
3 Group-Strategyproofness
Group-strategyproofness clashes with even the mildest criteria of fairness and
efficiency.
Theorem 1 If there are at least three agents and three houses, then no ex-
post Pareto optimal, group-strategyproof mechanism ρ : Ω → ∆X treats
equals equally.
Proof Suppose the ex-post Pareto optimal and group-strategyproof mech-
anism ρ : Ω→ ∆X did treat equals equally. Let {a, b, c} ⊂ H \ {∅}. Say the
preferences %i, %′1, and %◦2 all rank a, b, and c above any other house. The
three preferences agree on all houses other than a, b, and c (so %i, %′1, and
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%◦2 coincide on H \ {a, b, c}). Their different rankings of a, b, and c are given
by the following table
%i a b c
%′1 b a c
%◦2 a c b
Let % be such that each agent has the preference %i. At %, (%′1,%−1),
and (%◦2,%−2) all n ≥ 3 agents prefer a, b and c to all other houses (and to
homelessness) and a, b and c must, by the ex-post Pareto optimality of ρ,
be matched with probability 1 under ρ(%), ρ(%′1,%−1), and ρ(%◦2,%−2). By
equal treatment of equals each agent obtains a, b, c with probability 1
n
under
ρ(%). Since ρ is ex-post Pareto optimal, agent 1 may never get a under ρ(%′1
,%−1). Equal treatment of equals then implies that each agent i 6= 1 receives
a with probability 1
n−1 under ρ(%′1,%−1). Since ρ is strategyproof, agent 2
must obtain a with probability 1
n
under ρ(%◦2,%−2). By equal treatment of
equals all other agents must equally share the remaining probability mass
n−1
n
, implying ρi(%◦2,%−2)(a) = 1n for all i ∈ N . Since ρ is ex-post Pareto
optimal agent 2 may never get b under ρ(%◦2,%−2). Equal treatment of
equals then implies that each agent i 6= 2 obtains b with probability 1
n−1
under ρ(%◦2,%−2).
Finally consider ρ(%′1,%◦2,%−{1,2}). Since %′1 and %1 both rank a and b
at the top agent 1 must, by strategy-proofness, get a or b under ρ(%′1,%◦2
,%−{1,2}) with the same probability as under ρ(%◦2,%−2). Since %◦2 and %2
both rank a at the top agent 2 must, by strategy-proofness, get a under
ρ(%′1,%◦2,%−{1,2}) with the same probability as under ρ(%′1,%−1). In sum we
obtain
ρ1(%′1,%◦2,%−{1,2})(a) + ρ1(%′1,%◦2,%−{1,2})(b) = 1n +
1
n−1
and ρ2(%′1,%◦2,%−{1,2})(a) = 1n−1 .
So when agents 1 and 2 declare %′1 and %◦2 at % agent 1’s probability to
receive one of his two most preferred houses and agent 2’s probability to
receive his most preferred house respectively increase from 2
n
to 1
n
+ 1
n−1 and
from 1
n
to 1
n−1 . Consequently, ρ is not group-strategyproof. 
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The proof goes through unchanged if we only consider matching problems
without outside options (Ωˆ, Xˆ). For x ∈ X to be Pareto optimal at some
%∈ Ωˆ, x must match as many agents as possible. So if ρ : Ωˆ → ∆X is ex-
post Pareto optimal, then any x in the support of some ρ(%) is a matching
without outside options (x ∈ Xˆ) and we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If there are at least three agents and three houses, then no
ex-post Pareto optimal, group-strategyproof mechanism ρ : Ωˆ → ∆Xˆ for
matching problems without outside options treats equals equally.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 stand in the tradition of impossibility results
on fair, efficient, and non-manipulable mechanisms for matching problems.
As already discussed in the introduction, Bogomolnaia and Moulin’s [1] im-
possibility result imposes a weaker notion of non-manipulability (strategy-
proofness), a stronger notion of efficiency (ordinal efficiency), and the same
criterion of fairness (equal treatment of equals). Nesterov [5] combines the
weaker notions of non-manipulability and efficiency discussed here with a
stronger criterion of fairness to show that no envy-free mechanism is ex-post
Pareto optimal and strategyproof.
4 Non-Bossiness under Randomization
Following Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein [7] ρ : Ω˜ → ∆X is non-bossy
if ρi(%) = ρi(%′i,%−i) ⇒ ρ(%) = ρ(%′i,%−i) holds for all triples (i,%,%′i).
Let there be a set of mechanisms M = {ρ1, ρ2, · · · ρK} with ρk : Ω˜ → ∆X
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Then the mechanism ρ∗ : Ω˜ → ∆X arises out of a
randomization over the set M if there exists a lottery pi on {1, · · · , K}
with pi(k) > 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K and
ρ∗(%)(x) =
K∑
1=k
pi(k)ρk(%)(x) for all x ∈ X.
If pi is the uniform distribution on set M , then ρ∗ arises out of uniform
randomization over M .
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Theorem 2 Let ρ∗ : Ω˜→ ∆X arise out of a randomization over {ρ1, · · · , ρK}
where each ρk : Ω˜ → ∆X is strategyproof and non-bossy. Then ρ∗ is non-
bossy.
Proof Fix (i,%,%′i) such that ρ∗i (%) = ρ∗i (%′i,%−i). Suppose ρk
∗
i (%) 6=
ρk
∗
i (%′i,%−i) held for some 1 ≤ k∗ ≤ K. For h∗ the %i-best house where
the two lotteries differ, we have
∑
h%ih∗ ρ
k∗
i (%)(h) 6=
∑
h%ih∗ ρ
k∗
i (%′i,%−i)(h).
Since all ρk are strategyproof,
∑
h%ih∗ ρ
k
i (%)(h) ≥
∑
h%ih∗ ρ
k
i (%′i,%−i)(h)
holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K. In combination with pi(k∗) > 0 (as required by
ρ∗ arising out of a randomization over {ρ1, · · · , ρK}) we obtain∑
h%ih∗
ρk
∗
i (%)(h) >
∑
h%ih∗
ρk
∗
i (%′i,%−i)(h)⇒
K∑
1=k
pi(k)
∑
h%ih∗
ρki (%)(h) >
K∑
1=k
pi(k)
∑
h%ih∗
ρki (%′i,%−i)(h)⇒∑
h%ih∗
ρ∗i (%)(h) >
∑
h%ih∗
ρ∗i (%′i,%−i)(h),
a contradiction to the assumption that ρ∗i (%) = ρ∗i (%′i,%−i). So ρki (%) =
ρki (%′i,%−i) holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Since every ρk is non-bossy, ρk(%) =
ρk(%′i,%−i) holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, implying ρ∗(%) = ρ∗(%′i,%−i). In sum,
ρ∗ is non-bossy. 
Since Theorem 2 holds for the arbitrary domain Ω˜, it holds in particular
for Ω and Ωˆ, housing problems with and without outside options. Theorem
2 also applies if we replace the set of all matchings X with any other discrete
space of allocations Y . To see that strategy-proofness cannot be dropped
from Theorem 2 consider a matching problem with n = 3 and H = {a, b, c}
and three (deterministic) mechanisms α, β and γ, defined by the following
table (where %∗1 is such that a ∗1 b ∗1 c):
α(%) β(%) γ(%)
%1=%∗1 (a, c, b) (b, c, a) (c, b, a)
%1 6=%∗1 (b, a, c) (c, a, b) (a, c, b).
Agent 1 alone determines the matching in these mechanisms; agent 1’s
match under α, β or γ changes if and only if the others’ matches change
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and α, β and γ are non-bossy. However the mechanism ρ◦ : Ω → ∆X that
arises out of the uniform randomization over α, β and γ is bossy. For any
%, agent 1 faces a uniform lottery over {a, b, c} under ρ◦(%). However,
the other agents’ lotteries over houses depend on agent 1’s announcement.
Agent 2, for example, never gets house a if agent 1 announces %∗1, but gets
a with probability 2
3
if agent 1 announces any other preference. In a similar
vein, non-bossy mechanisms might arise out of the randomization over bossy
mechanisms. Theorem 2 does not extend to a larger domain of preferences
that allows for indifferences. Examples to prove the latter two claims are
available on request.
5 Random Serial Dictatorship
Papai [6] showed that a deterministic mechanism is group-strategyproof if
and only if it is strategyproof and non-bossy. I use random serial dictatorship
as an example to show that this equivalence does not hold for random mech-
anisms. For any permutation p : N → N define the serial dictatorship sdp
as the deterministic mechanism that uses p to sequentially entitle agents to
choose houses. So sdpp(1)(%) is agent p(1)’s most preferred house according to
%p(1), sdpp(2)(%) is the %p(2)-preferred house among all remaining ones and so
forth. Random serial dictatorship rsd : Ωˆ→ ∆Xˆ arises out of a uniform ran-
domization over all serial dictatorships {sdp | p : N → N a permutation }.
Any sdp is strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto optimal. Random serial
dictatorship treats equals equally. Theorems 1 and 2 therefore imply that
random serial dictatorship is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.
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